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Abstract. We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods
among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties
of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case
of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency.
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1. Introduction
The study of principled ways of allocating divisible goods among agents has long been a cen-
tral topic in mathematical economics. The method of choice that emerged from this study, the
Arrow-Debreu market model [1], provides a powerful approach based on pricing and leads to
the fundamental welfare theorems. However, these market-based methods have limitations when
agents are assumed to be strategic, e.g., these methods are not incentive compatible. Issues of
the latter kind have been studied within the area of mechanism design for the last four decades,
and have played a large role in the last decade in algorithmic game theory [22].
In this paper our primary focus is on deriving a non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisi-
ble goods, that satisfies incentive-compatibility, Pareto optimality and envy-freeness. A natural
approach to achieving Pareto optimality and envy-freeness is to start in a greedy fashion by as-
signing agents their most favored goods, and gradually moving on to their less favored choices.
It is easy to come up with several ways of making this approach precise—two are described in
Section 6—and achieve Pareto optimality and envy-freeness. However, it is not a priori clear that
it is possible to also achieve incentive compatibility, without which a mechanism is of doubtful
merit in an environment of strategic agents. In the main contribution of our paper we show that
a third version of this approach, the Synchronized Greedy (SG) mechanism, achieves all three
properties.
The SG mechanism can be seen as generalizing a mechanism introduced by Cre`s and Moulin [8],
called Probabilistic Serial (PS), in the context of a job scheduling problem, and studied further
by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] for the allocation of indivisible goods1. The preference model
assumed by [6] was first order stochastic dominance, which we will shorten to sd-preference.
They showed that in this model, PS is efficient, envy-proof and weakly incentive compatible.
Furthermore, they showed that in this model, no mechanism satisfies all three properties, i.e.,
efficiency, envy-proofness and incentive compatibility. In view of the second result, we need to
relax the model in order to obtain a mechanism satisfying all three properties; we do so by
resorting to the lexicographic preference relation and assuming that the goods are divisible.
Lexicographic preferences date back to the work of Hausner [12] and are of interest to economists
for the following reasons. They yield a total order on the set of all allocations (unlike sd-
preferences, say, which only form a partial order) and they can be seen as a strong-preferences
limit of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. A preference relation that is complete, transitive and
satisfies the continuity condition that preferences between allocations are preserved under limits
is known to be representable by a utility function [19]. Of these, lexicographic preferences forgo
continuity. What favorable properties can be achieved in the area of goods allocation using only
non-pricing mechanisms is a difficult question. The present paper can be regarded as carving out
a certain special case, namely the limit in which agents have very strong preferences among the
goods, and providing strong positive guarantees in this case. In this limit there is an additional
motivation to use non-pricing mechanisms, because very strong preferences might cause a pricing
mechanism to do little more than ensure that the wealthiest agents get what they want. By
focusing on non-pricing mechanisms, we can study what game-theoretic properties an allocation
mechanism can achieve, without depending on what resources the agents possess or care to invest
in the game.
There are many every-day examples where something like our model comes up—naturally, not
in market economy transactions, but in other societal mechanisms for allocation. An important
class is allocation of public resources, e.g., placement lotteries in public schools, see Kojima [17]
1These mechanisms for allocation of indivisible goods are randomized. Our focus on divisible goods is just as
general, since an allocation of divisible goods can be used without further modification as a randomized allocation
of indivisible goods in the same quantities.
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for further examples and references. (Note also that this kind of example employs a standard
reduction of the indivisible goods case to the divisible goods case by randomization.)
The recent paper of Saban and Sethuraman [24] builds on our work and solves several open
problems stated in an earlier version of this paper [26]; these results are described at the end
of Section 1.2. The broader challenge of the utility-functions version of the allocation problem
remains largely open. The simplicity of the SG mechanism is perhaps encouraging toward the
existence of allocation mechanisms maintaining favorable (maybe weaker) game-theoretic prop-
erties in this setting. Finally, we note that independent of our work, Cho [7] has also studied the
use of lexicographic preferences in the context of probabilistically assigning indivisible objects to
agents.
Parameters of the problem. In the allocation problem there are m distinct divisible goods
which need to be allocated among n agents. Good j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) is available in the amount
qj > 0, and agent i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is to receive a specified ri > 0 combined quantity of all goods; the
parameters satisfy
∑
j qj ≥
∑
i ri, i.e., the total supply is at least as large as the total demand. If
this inequality fails, our mechanism may still be run after rescaling expectations so that each agent
i is to receive the quantity r′i = ri(
∑
qj)/(
∑
r`). So in the sequel we may assume
∑
j qj ≥
∑
i ri.
Preferences: the non-Leontief case. The non-Leontief case of our problem is this. An allo-
cation of goods is a list of numbers aij ≥ 0, with
∑
j aij = ri and
∑
i aij ≤ qj , indicating that
agent i receives quantity aij of good j. The vector ai∗ = (ai1, . . . , aim) is referred to as agent
i’s (share of the) allocation. Each agent i has a preference list, which is a permutation pii of the
goods; (aipii(1), . . . , aipii(m)) is agent i’s sorted allocation. Agent i’s preference among allocations
is induced by lexicographic order. That is to say, agent i lexicographic-prefers ai∗ to bi∗, written
ai∗ >i bi∗, if the leftmost nonzero coordinate of (aipii(1), . . . , aipii(m))− (bipii(1), . . . , bipii(m)) is posi-
tive. Furthermore, we will say that agent i prefers ai∗ to bi∗ in the stochastic domination order [6],
or sd-prefers ai∗ to bi∗, written ai∗ >sdi bi∗, if
for all k = 1, . . . ,m :
k∑
`=1
aipii(`) ≥
k∑
`=1
bipii(`),
with at least one of the inequalities being strict. The symbols ≥i and 6≥i will have the obvious
interpretations.
Since an agent’s preferences depend only on his own share of the allocation, we speak in-
terchangeably of an agent’s preference for an allocation or an allocation share. In particular,
ai∗ >i bi∗ may be written more simply as a >i b, and ai∗ >sdi bi∗ may be written as a >
sd
i b.
Preferences: Leontief Bundles. Some of our results hold in the more general setting of lex-
icographic preferences among Leontief bundles, and some fail in that setting; details below. A
Leontief bundle is specified by a non-negative vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λm) ∈ Rm+ (where R+ = non-
negative reals). The set of goods j for which λj is positive is called the support of this bundle.
(If the set is of size one, we refer to this as a singleton bundle; in Economics this is sometimes
also called the linear case.) If q ∈ Rm+ then the bundle λ may be allocated from q in any quantity
α ∈ R+ such that αλj ≤ qj for all j. In an instance of our problem, a list of M Leontief bundles
λ1, . . . , λM is specified, including among them the m singleton bundles (hence always M ≥ m).
It is convenient, and in our context sacrifices no generality, to impose the convention that for
every bundle λk,
∑m
1 λ
k
j = 1.
The case m = M , in which all bundles are singletons, is of course a special case of the Leontief
framework, but to distinguish it from the general situation we call it the “non-Leontief” case.
The framework we are concerned with is that each agent i has a preference list specified by a
permutation pii of the bundles. A Leontief allocation is an n×M matrix ` in which `ik represents
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the quantity of bundle k allocated to agent i. A Leontief allocation l imposes the goods allocation
A(l), an n×m matrix, by A(l)ij =
∑M
k=1 likλ
k
j . We further require that a Leontief allocation satisfy
the conditions
∑
j A(l)ij = ri (thanks to the convention above this is equivalent to
∑
k lik = ri)
and
∑
iA(l)ij ≤ qj . We speak of A(l)i∗ and li∗ as agent i’s share of, respectively, the goods and
the Leontief bundles. The vector (lipii(1), . . . , lipii(M)) is agent i’s sorted Leontief share. Agent i’s
preference among allocations is induced by lexicographic order on his share of the allocation. That
is to say, agent i lexicographic-prefers l to l′, written l >i l′, if the leftmost nonzero coordinate
of (lipii(1), . . . , lipii(M)) − (l′ipii(1), . . . , l′ipii(M)) is positive. Thus, for any goods allocation a, there
is a favored Leontief allocation, denoted Lpi(a), defined by providing each agent with the best
Leontief share that can be assembled from his share of the goods—to be explicit, this is obtained
by starting with ai∗ as the available goods vector, and then, for k from 1 to M , setting Lpi(a)ipii(k)
to be the largest α such that ((available goods vector)−αλk) ∈ RM+ , then subtracting αλk from
the available goods vector and iterating.
We say that agent i sd-prefers allocation a to b, written a >sdi b, if
for all K = 1, . . . ,M :
K∑
k=1
Lpi(a)ipii(k) ≥
K∑
k=1
Lpi(b)ipii(k),
with at least one of the inequalities being strict.
The two orders. Observe that “lexicographic-prefers” is a complete preference relation without
indifference contours (since it is antisymmetric for distinct allocation shares), and that “sd-prefers”
is an incomplete preference relation; moreover the lexicographic order is a refinement of the sd
order, i.e., sd-prefers implies lexicographic-prefers. The phrase “agent i weakly X-prefers” will be
used to include the possibility that agent i’s share is identical in the two allocations.
1.1. Our results. The SG mechanism is deterministic, treats all agents symmetrically, and has
the following properties.
Properties w.r.t. sd preference:
• If all ri’s are equal, the allocation produced by the SG mechanism in response to truthful
bids is envy-free in the following sense: each agent weakly sd-prefers his allocation to that
of any other agent. This holds also in the Leontief case.
Properties w.r.t. lexicographic preference:
(Since most of our paper deals with the relation “lexicographic-prefers”, we subsequently ab-
breviate it to “prefers”.)
• The allocation produced by the SG mechanism in response to truthful bids is Pareto
efficient. This holds also in the Leontief case.
• Incentive compatibility for a single agent: In the non-Leontief case, the SG mechanism is
strategy-proof if minj qj ≥ maxi ri.
We give counterexamples (a) in the absence of this inequality, (b) for the Leontief case.
• Generalizing the previous item, we have: Incentive compatibility for a coalition: The SG
mechanism is group strategy-proof against coalitions of ` agents if minj qj ≥ maxS:|S|=`
∑
i∈S ri.
• The running time to implement the SG mechanism is O˜(mn) in the non-Leontief case,
and O˜(n(m2 +M)) in the Leontief case.
• Any Pareto efficient allocation can be produced using a suitable “variable speeds” exten-
sion of the SG mechanism. This holds also in the Leontief case. (However, the variable
speeds extension does not possess the rest of the properties listed above.)
The incentive compatibility properties are the main results of this paper.
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1.2. Literature. There has been considerable work on the strategy-proof allocation of divisible
goods in Arrow-Debreu economies, starting with the seminal work of Hurwicz [13], e.g., see
[9, 15, 25, 27, 28, 30]. Most of these results are negative, among the recent ones being Zhou’s
result showing that in a 2-agent, n-good pure exchange economy, there can be no allocation
mechanism that is efficient, non-dictatorial (i.e., both agents must receive non-zero allocations)
and strategy-proof [30].
The paper that is most closely related to our work is that of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6].
In their setting there are n agents and n indivisible goods, each agent having a total preference
ordering over the goods; the desired outcome is a matching of goods with agents. A straightforward
mechanism for allocating one good to each agent is random priority (RP): pick a uniformly random
permutation of the agents and ask each agent in turn to select a good among those left. It is easy
to see that this mechanism is ex post efficient, i.e., the allocation it produces can be represented as
a probability distribution over Pareto efficient deterministic allocations, and it is strategy-proof.
However, it is not ex ante efficient. A random allocation is said to ex ante efficient if for any
profile of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities that are consistent with the preferences of agents,
the expected utility vector is Pareto efficient. It is easy to see that ex ante efficiency implies ex
post efficiency.
Solving a conjecture of Gale [10], Zhou [29] showed that no strategy-proof mechanism that elicits
von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities and achieves Pareto efficiency can find a “fair” solution even
in the weak sense of equal treatment of equals. He further showed that the solution found by RP
may not be efficient if agents are endowed with utilities that are consistent with their preferences.
Hence, ex ante efficiency had to be sacrificed, if strategy-proofness and fairness were desired.
In the face of these choices, the work of Bogomolnaia and Moulin gave the notion of ordinal
efficiency that is intermediate between ex post and ex ante efficiency; an allocation a is ordinally
efficient if there is no other allocation b such that every agent sd-prefers b to a. They went on to
show that the mechanism called probabilistic serial (PS), introduced in Cre`s and Moulin [8], yields
an ordinally efficient allocation. Further they show that PS is envy-free and weakly strategy-proof,
defined appropriately for the partial order “sd-prefers”. Finally, Bogomolnaia and Moulin define
an extension of PS by introducing different “eating rates” and show that this set of mechanisms
characterizes the set of all ordinally efficient allocations.
Katta and Sethuraman [16] generalize the setting of Bogomolnaia and Moulin to the “full
domain”, i.e., agents may be indifferent between pairs of goods. Thus, each agent partitions the
goods by equality and defines a total order on the equivalence classes of her partition (the agent
is equally happy with any good received from an equivalence class). For this setting, they give a
randomized mechanism that is a generalization (different from ours) of PS and achieves the same
game-theoretic properties as PS.
A mechanism that probabilistically allocates indivisible goods can also be viewed as one that
fractionally allocates divisible goods. Under the latter interpretation, the SG mechanism is equiv-
alent to PS for the case that m = n and the quantity of each good and the requirement of each
agent is one unit. An important difference is that Bogomolnaia and Moulin analyze PS under
an incomplete preference relation (stochastic dominance) in which “most” allocation shares are
incomparable; whereas we analyze SG under a complete preference relation (lexicographic) that
is a refinement of stochastic dominance. The statement that a mechanism’s allocation is Pareto
efficient w.r.t. lexicographic preferences is considerably stronger than the same statement w.r.t.
stochastic dominance preferences, because each agent’s share is dominated by more alternative
shares in the lexicographic order, than it is in the sd order; so, fewer allocations are Pareto efficient
in the lexicographic than in the sd order. Our results should be viewed therefore as demonstrat-
ing that the PS mechanism and its natural generalization, SG, have far stronger game-theoretic
properties than even envisioned in [6].
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For somewhat related questions primarily regarding exchange economies, see Barbera` and Jack-
son [5], Nicolo [21], Ghodsi et al. [11], and Li and Xue [18]. Finally, we remark only that the
problem of allocating a single divisible good among multiple agents with known privileges is con-
siderably different; the principal issue studied in that problem is how to make the division in a
manner that is fair w.r.t. the given privileges. This is known as the bankruptcy problem and has
a long history, e.g., see [23, 2]. Despite an interesting resemblance between the PS mechanism
and some of the mechanisms used in the solutions of that problem [14], the issues at stake in the
bankruptcy literature are distinct from those in our paper and its predecessors.
Saban and Sethuraman [24] solve some of the open problems stated in an earlier version of
this paper. They consider the special case that all ri = 1. First they show that our condition
minj qj ≥ maxi ri is tight in the sense that for any q1 < 1 there exists an n, a finite list q2, . . . , qn,
and agent preferences such that no mechanism is efficient, envy-free and strategyproof. They also
show that if q1 < 1, and list q2, . . . , qn and the agent preferences are given, then SG achieves
all three properties if and only if any mechanism achieves all three properties. Finally for the
generalized setting of Katta and Sethuraman, where agents can be indifferent between objects,
they show that no mechanism can satisfy all three properties.
Since the PS rule is not strategyproof, recent work has studied the situation where agents are
strategic. A Nash equilibrium for the PS rule is a preference profile for which no agent has an
incentive to report a different profile. [4] show that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist;
however determining whether a given preference profile is a Nash equilibrium is coNP-complete.
2. The Synchronized Greedy Mechanism
The mechanism is simple. Each agent i submits a preference list σi. The submitted list may
or may not, of course, agree with his true preference list pii.
(A simple case to consider is that of M = m = n and all qj = ri = 1. Because of the restriction
that each preference list must include all m singleton bundles, each agent’s preference list in this
case is a permutation of the m goods. Despite being quite special, this case, or the slightly more
general case in which M = m ≤ n and all ri are equal, is already interesting to analyze and is
well motivated by the examples, mentioned earlier, involving sharing of tasks or of scarce public
resources.)
The mechanism simulates the following physical process. Consider each good j as a “liquid”,
and each agent as a receptacle of capacity ri. The mechanism starts out at time 0 by (for all i
in parallel) pouring bundle λσi(1) into receptacle i at rate ri units of liquid per unit time. Each
good j is therefore being drained at rate
∑
i riλ
σi(1)
j . (Note that since
∑
j λj = 1, the total liquid
being added to receptacle i per unit time is ri, as desired.)
This continues until one of the goods, say j, is exhausted. For all agents who were currently
being allocated bundles with j in their support, their favorite Leontief bundle has now been
exhausted. (We say that a Leontief bundle has been exhausted at a given time if any of the goods
in its support has been exhausted, and otherwise that the bundle is available.) All such agents,
i, are immediately allocated the next available bundle on their preference list, and the pouring
of bundles continues. The algorithm continues in this way, allocating to an agent from the next
available bundle whenever the current bundle has been exhausted. Since the singleton bundles
are included in all preference lists, all agents continuously receive goods at rate ri until time 1, at
which time they simultaneously complete their full allocation.
Observe that the Leontief allocation l constructed by SG satisfies l = Lpi(A(l)) because the
bundles are provided to each agent greedily based on the availability of goods.
This continuous process can easily be converted into a discrete algorithm with the run time
cited earlier: maintain a priority queue of goods, keyed by termination times. Each time a good
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is exhausted, each agent is assigned its next unexhausted bundle, and an updated termination
time for each good is computed using the coefficients of the active bundles.
Observe that if an agent prefers bundle λ to bundle λ′, and support(λ) ⊆ support(λ′), then λ′
may be removed from the agent’s preference list. It cannot be allocated to the agent by SG nor
can it be part of any Pareto efficient allocation to the agent.
3. Properties of the Synchronized Greedy Mechanism
3.1. Pareto Efficiency. Let lσ be the allocation created by the SG mechanism in response to
bids σ declared by the agents. As before pi denotes the truthful bids.
Theorem 1. The allocation produced by the SG mechanism in response to truthful bids is Pareto
efficient w.r.t. lexicographic preference. That is to say, for all l 6= lpi, ∃i l <i lpi.
Proof. For agent i and for K ≥ 1 let tiK = 1ri
∑K
k=1 l
pi
ipii(k)
. If agent i receives a positive quantity
of his K’th-most-favored bundle, then tiK is the time when that bundle is exhausted in SG. If the
agent receives nothing from the bundle then the bundle is exhausted in SG no later than tiK .
Suppose for contradiction the existence of l s.t. ∀i l ≥i lpi, and for some i, l >i lpi. Let t be
minimum s.t. ∃i,K s.t. t = tiK < 1ri
∑K
k=1 lipii(k). Note, if ti′K′ < t then ti′K′ =
1
ri′
∑K′
k=1 li′pi′i(k).
For every one of the bundles b ∈ {pii(1), . . . , pii(K)} there is a good j(b) that appears positively
in b and which is exhausted by time t. Since tiK <
1
ri
∑K
k=1 lipii(k) while tiK′ =
1
ri
∑K′
k=1 lipii(k) for all
K ′ < K, some agent i′ 6= i receives strictly less of good j(pii(K)) in l than in lpi. Since j(pii(K))
is exhausted in SG by time t, this means that there is some K ′′ such that 1ri′
∑K′′
k=1 li′pii′ (k) <
1
ri′
∑K′′
k=1 l
pi
i′pii′ (k)
≤ t. This contradicts the minimality of t. 
3.2. Strategy-Proofness. A mechanism is said to be strategy-proof if for every agent and for
every list of bids by the remaining agents, the agent cannot obtain a strictly improved allocation
by lying.
Theorem 2. In the non-Leontief case, the SG mechanism is strategy-proof if min qj ≥ max ri.
Proof. Without loss of generality focus on agent 1. For the remainder of this proof pi2, . . . , pin are
arbitrary bids by the agents 2, . . . , n, but pi1 is agent 1’s truthful bid. We need to show that for
any bid σ1 (and write σ = (σ1, pi2, . . . , pin)), a
σ
1∗ ≤1 api1∗. The theorem is trivial if aσ = api.
The theorem is also trivial if agent 1, bidding truthfully, receives only his top choice. So we
may suppose that agent 1 does not receive the entire allocation of any one good.
We may also suppose that if aσ1j = 0 and a
σ
1j′ > 0, then σ
−1
1 (j) > σ
−1
1 (j
′). (Define σ−11 (j) to
be the s such that σ1(s) = j. Define pi
−1
1 (j) analogously.) In other words, all the requests in σ1
that come up empty may as well be deferred to the end.
Let G(j) = {j′ : pi−11 (j′) ≤ pi−11 (j) and api1j′ > 0}. These are the goods that agent 1 weakly
prefers to good j and receives a positive quantity of in the allocation api.
Say that agent 1 sacrifices good j in σ if:
(1) api1j > 0,
(2) σ−11 (j) > |G(j)|, and
(3) pi−11 (j) < pi
−1
1 (j
′) if j′ also satisfies (1),(2).
That is to say, j is the most-preferred good which agent 1 receives a positive quantity of in pi, but
requests later in σ than in pi.
For a collection of bids ρ let T ρj be the time at which good j is exhausted if the mechanism is
run with bids ρ.
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Figure 1. The mechanism with truthful vs. lying bids of Agent 1
Agent 1 must sacrifice some good, call it B, since otherwise the allocation will not change. See
Figure 1. We will show that agent 1 receives strictly less of B in σ than in pi, and that this is not
compensated for by getting more of more-preferred goods.
Lemma 3. If D is a good and T piD < T
pi
B, then T
σ
D ≤ T piD.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let D be a counterexample minimizing T piD. Since T
pi
D < T
pi
B,
D 6= B.
Now let i be any agent (who may or may not be agent 1) for whom apiiD > 0. Due to the
minimality of D, each of the goods j which i prefers in pi to D, has T σj ≤ T pij . Therefore i requests
D at a time in σ that is at least as soon as the time i requests it in pi.
Since this holds for all i who received a positive allocation of D in pi, the lemma follows. 
Let NB be the set of agents i 6= 1 for whom apiiB > 0. The condition on ri’s and qj ’s ensures
that this set is nonempty.
Due to the lemma, for each agent in NB, the request time for B in σ is weakly earlier than it
is in pi. Now let C be the good such that pi−11 (C) is maximal subject to pi
−1
1 (C) < pi
−1
1 (B) and
api1C > 0. Due to the lemma, all goods j
′ such that pi−11 (j
′) ≤ pi−11 (C) have T σj′ ≤ T pij′ . Next we
show:
Proposition 4. If pi−11 (j
′) ≤ pi−11 (C), then aσ1j′ = api1j′.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let pi−11 (j
′) be minimal such that pi−11 (j
′) ≤ pi−11 (C) and aσ1j′ 6= api1j′ .
There are two possibilities to consider.
(a) aσ1j′ < a
pi
1j′ . This is not possible because then a
σ
1∗ <1 api1∗.
(b) aσ1j′ > a
pi
1j′ . Note:
Lemma 5. Let j1, j2 be such that pi
−1
1 (j1) ≤ pi−11 (B), pi−11 (j2) ≤ pi−11 (B), api1j1 > 0, and pi−11 (j1) <
pi−11 (j2). Then σ
−1
1 (j1) < σ
−1
1 (j2).
Proof. Consider the least j1 that is part of a pair j1, j2 violating the lemma. Then j1 satisfies
conditions (1),(2) above, contradicting that B is the good sacrificed by agent 1. 
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Figure 2. Failure of strategy-proofness without the hypothesis of Theorem 2
It follows that T σj′ ≥
∑
j′′:pi−11 (j′′)≤pi−11 (j′) a
σ
1j′′ . Due to the minimality of j
′, this means that if
aσ1j′ > a
pi
1j′ , then T
σ
j′ > T
pi
j′ , contradicting our earlier conclusion. This completes demonstration of
the Proposition. 
A consequence of the Proposition is that T σC = T
pi
C .
Since agent 1 sacrifices B, his request time for B in σ is strictly greater than his request time
for B in pi.
Recall that NB is nonempty. At time T
pi
B, the agents of NB have received as least as much of
B in σ as they have in pi, and the latter is positive. On the other hand, at the same time T piB,
agent 1 has received strictly less of B in σ than he has in pi. In order for agent 1 to receive at
least as much of B in σ as in pi, he would have to receive all of B that is allocated after time T piB;
however, that is not possible, because the set of agents receiving B after T piB includes NB. Thus
aσ1∗ <1 api1∗. 
3.3. Necessity of a Hypothesis on {ri}, {qj}. We next provide an example in which strategy-
proofness fails in the absence of the condition max ri ≤ min qj . For convenience now let r1 ≥
. . . ≥ rn and q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qm.
Example 6. Let n = 2 and m = 3. Let r1 = r2 = 3/2; label the goods A,B,C, let qA =
qB = qC = 1, and let the preference lists be pi1 = (A,B,C), pi2 = (B,C,A). If agent 1 bids
truthfully he receives the sorted allocation (1, 0, 1/2). If instead he bids (B,A,C) (while agent 2
bids truthfully), he receives the improved sorted allocation (1, 1/2, 0). See Figure 2.
This example does not limit the theorem sharply, because it uses r1 = (3/2)q1 rather than r1
arbitrarily close to q1. Jeremy Hurwitz has pointed out that one may construct similar examples
whenever r1 ≥ q1/(1− q2/
∑
qj); this would appear to be a tight bound.
3.4. Failure of strategy-proofness for the Leontief case. Theorem 2 has no equivalent for
general Leontief bundles. Consider the following four-agent system with r1 = r2 = r3 = r4 = 1
and three goods in supply qA = qB = 1, qC = 2. Agent 1’s desired Leontief bundles are in the
preference order (A,B,C) (this agent is interested only in singleton bundles); agent 2 and 3’s
desired Leontief bundles are in the order (12A +
1
2B,C,A,B); agent 4’s Leontief bundles are in
the order (B,C,A).
Under truthful bidding agent 1 receives the sorted goods allocation (1/2, 0, 1/2). By bidding
instead (B,A,C), agent 1 receives the improved sorted goods allocation (2/3, 1/3, 0). See Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Failure of strategy-proofness in the Leontief case
3.5. Group Strategy-Proofness. A mechanism is group strategy-proof against a family F of
subsets of agents if for every “coalition” S ∈ F and for any list of bids by the agents outside of S,
the agents of S cannot obtain an improved allocation by lying, where by “improved allocation”
we mean that no agent of S obtains a worse allocation and at least one obtains a strictly better
allocation.
We now provide the following generalization of Theorem 2:
Theorem 7. In the non-Leontief case, the SG mechanism is group strategy-proof against the
family of subsets S for which minj qj ≥
∑
i∈S ri.
Corollary 8. In the non-Leontief case, the SG mechanism is group strategy-proof against coali-
tions of ` agents if minj qj ≥ maxS:|S|=`
∑
i∈S ri.
The proof of Theorem 7 follows a structure similar to that of Theorem 2 but the argument
is complicated by the fact that different agents in S can sacrifice different goods, and some of
the agents may actually be better off due to their untruthful bids (as they may benefit from the
interactions among the several lies). The proof needs to effectively “chase through” an unbounded
iteration of good transfers relative to api, and show that some agent in the coalition is worse off
than in pi. Fortunately, this can be done without explicitly pursuing the iteration.
Proof. Let S be a minimal counterexample. That is,
(a) minj qj ≥
∑
i∈S ri;
(b) With pii representing in this proof the truthful preferences for i ∈ S and arbitrary prefer-
ences for i /∈ S, there are bids σi for i ∈ S such that every i ∈ S “is a willing participant
in the coalition S”, namely (with σ` = pi` for ` /∈ S) aσi∗ ≥i apii∗;
(c) For some i ∈ S, aσi∗ >i apii∗;
(d) No strict subset of S satisfies (a),(b),(c).
Note by minimality that in σ, every agent i ∈ S bids untruthfully (differently from pi) and this
has an effect, namely, if i reverts to bidding according to pi then the allocation is different than
in σ.
If apiipii(1) = ri for all i ∈ S, that is, with truthful bids these agents receive only their top choices,
then none of them can be strictly rewarded by submitting a different bid.
Otherwise (i.e., if apiipii(1) < ri for some i ∈ S), then thanks to the hypothesis, under the truthful
bids pi, every good has a positive allocation outside S.
We may simplify the argument slightly by supposing that for each agent i ∈ S, if aσij = 0 and
aσij′ > 0, then σ
−1
i (j) > σ
−1
i (j
′). In other words, all the requests that come up empty may as well
be deferred to the end.
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Let G(i, j) = {j′ : pi−1i (j′) ≤ pi−1i (j) and apiij′ > 0}.
Say that agent i sacrifices good j in σ if:
(1) apiij > 0,
(2) σ−1i (j) > |G(i, j)|, and
(3) pi−1i (j) < pi
−1
i (j
′) if j′ also satisfies (1),(2).
Some good must be sacrificed by some agent, since otherwise the allocation will not change.
(However, while every agent in S is untruthful, not every i ∈ S necessarily sacrifices a good;
setting σi(j) > pii(j) might have an effect even if a
pi
ij = 0 because of increased availability of j due
to bidding changes of other agents.)
Of all the sacrificed goods let B be one for which T piB is minimal.
Lemma 9. If D is a good and T piD < T
pi
B, then T
σ
D ≤ T piD.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let D be a counterexample minimizing T piD. By the minimality of
B, D cannot be a sacrificed good.
Now let i be any agent (inside or outside of S) for whom apiiD > 0. Due to the minimality of
D, each of the goods j which i truthfully prefers to D, has T σj ≤ T pij . Therefore i requests D at
a time in σ that is at least as soon as the time i requests it in pi.
Since this holds for all i who received a positive allocation of D in pi, the lemma follows. 
Let OB ⊆ S be the set of agents who sacrifice B, and let NB be the set of agents i for whom
apiiB > 0 but who do not sacrifice B. Due to the lemma, for each agent in NB, the request time
for B in σ is weakly earlier than it is in pi. Now consider an agent i ∈ OB. Let C be the good
such that pi−1i (C) is maximal subject to pi
−1
i (C) < pi
−1
i (B) and a
pi
iC > 0. Due to the lemma, all
goods j′ such that pi−1i (j
′) ≤ pi−1i (C) have T σj′ ≤ T pij′ . Next we show:
Proposition 10. If pi−1i (j
′) ≤ pi−1i (C), then aσij′ = apiij′.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let pi−1i (j
′) be minimal such that pi−1i (j
′) ≤ pi−1i (C) and aσij′ 6= apiij′ .
There are two possibilities to consider.
(a) aσij′ < a
pi
ij′ . This is not possible because i is a willing participant in the coalition.
(b) aσij′ > a
pi
ij′ . Note:
Lemma 11. Let j1, j2 be such that pi
−1
i (j1) ≤ pi−1i (B), pi−1i (j2) ≤ pi−1i (B), apiij1 > 0, and pi−1i (j1) <
pi−1i (j2). Then σ
−1
i (j1) < σ
−1
i (j2).
Proof. Identical to the proof of Lemma 5 with agent i in place of agent 1. 
It follows that T σj′ ≥
∑
j′′:pi−1i (j′′)≤pi−1i (j′) a
σ
ij′′ . Due to the minimality of j
′, this means that if
aσij′ > a
pi
ij′ , then T
σ
j′ > T
pi
j′ , contradicting our earlier conclusion. This completes demonstration of
the Proposition. 
A consequence of the Proposition is that T σC = T
pi
C .
Since agent i sacrifices B, his request time for B in σ is strictly greater than his request time
for B in pi.
Since we are in the case that every good has a positive allocation outside S, NB is nonempty.
At time T piB, the agents of NB have received as least as much of B in σ as they have in pi, and
the latter is positive. On the other hand, at the same time T piB, the agents of OB have received
strictly less of B in σ than they have in pi. In order for the agents of OB to receive collectively at
least as much of B in σ as in pi, they would have to receive all of B that is allocated after time
T piB; however, that is not possible, because the set of agents receiving B after T
pi
B includes NB.
Therefore there is some i ∈ OB for whom aσiB < apiiB. This contradicts the requirement that i be
a willing participant in the coalition S. 
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Example 12. Example 6, in which strategy-proofness failed absent the hypothesis of Theorem 2,
can be extended in a straightforward manner to one in which the group strategy-proof property
fails to hold absent the hypothesis of Corollary 8. Again use m = 3, but instead of two agents, use
n = 2` agents, the first half having the same preference order (A,B,C) as agent 1 in the earlier
example, and the second half having the same preference order (B,C,A) as agent 2 in the earlier
example. If all agents bid truthfully, then the first ` agents each receive the sorted allocation
(1, 0, 1/2); however if they lie and bid (B,A,C), while the remainder bid truthfully, then each
lying agent receives the improved sorted allocation (1, 1/2, 0).
4. Characterizing All Pareto Efficient Allocations
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] extended their mechanism by allowing players to receive goods at
time-varying rates. Specifically, for each agent i there is a speed function ηi mapping the time
interval [0, 1] into the nonnegative reals, such that for all i∫ 1
0
ηi(t) dt = ri.
Subject to these speeds, goods flow to agents in order of the preference lists they bid, just as
before. They showed that this extension characterizes all ordinally efficient allocations.
In this section, we obtain an analogous characterization of all Pareto efficient allocations by a
similar extension of our mechanism. Specifically, we prove that for any Pareto efficient allocation
of bundles, there exist speeds such that the extended SG mechanism produces that allocation.
We prove this after first noting that the extended SG mechanism always results in Pareto efficient
allocations.
In this section when ηi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are fixed, we let api (with the η’s implicit) be the goods
allocation produced by the extended SG mechanism with these speeds and truthful bids. We let
lpi = Lpi(api) be the corresponding allocation of bundles.
4.1. Pareto Efficiency.
Theorem 13. Let ηi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be any speed functions. Then the allocation lpi is Pareto efficient.
Proof. The argument is the same as for Theorem 1 with the proviso that the definition tiK =
1
ri
∑K
k=1 l
pi
ipii(k)
is replaced by tiK = inf{y :
∫ y
0 ηi(t) dt ≥
∑K
k=1 l
pi
ipii(k)
}. 
4.2. Characterizing All Pareto Efficient Allocations. If the last result mirrored the First
Welfare Theorem, the next mirrors the Second Welfare Theorem:
Theorem 14. Let pi be the collection of agent preference lists over bundles, and let l be a Pareto
efficient allocation. There exist speed functions ηi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that l = lpi.
Proof. As before the bundles are (λk)Mk=1, where for each k,
∑m
j=1 λ
k
j = 1, and λ
k
j ≥ 0 for all j.
Construction of the speeds ηi is simple. Let a “partial bundle allocation” be a list lˆik, each
lˆik ≥ 0, such that for every i,
∑
k,j lˆikλ
k
j ≤ ri, and for every j,
∑
i,k lˆikλ
k
j ≤ qj .
Initialize t = 0 and initialize each agent i with the empty partial allocation lˆik = 0 for all i, k.
Initialize cj to be the quantity of good j that is allocated in l. (Necessarily cj ≤ qj and∑
cj =
∑
ri. If
∑
qj >
∑
ri then for some j, cj < qj .)
Then repeat the following until t = 1.
Find an agent i for whom there is an ` such that lˆipii(`) < lipii(`), and such that for all `
′ < `,
the bundle pii(`
′) has been exhausted (that is to say, there is a good j such that λpii(`
′)
j > 0
and cj = 0.) To see that there is such an i, suppose the contrary, and consider all the agents
for whom
∑
k,j lˆikλ
k
j < ri. For each of them there is a favorite bundle which has not yet been
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exhausted. Evidently none of these agents is to be allocated in l any additional quantity of this
favorite bundle. However since these favorite bundles have not yet been exhausted, we can allocate
to every player a slight additional positive amount of his favorite unexhausted bundle, without
exhausting any additional goods. Any extension of this new partial bundle allocation to a full
bundle allocation, strictly Pareto dominates l, contrary to assumption.
Now set δ = (lipii(`) − lˆipii(`))/
∑
ri. For t < t
′ < t+ δ, make the settings ηi(t′) =
∑
ri and, for
i′ 6= i, ηi′(t′) = 0. Then increment lˆipii(`) by δ
∑
ri, and decrement each cj by the corresponding
amount, namely, decrement cj by λ
pii(`)
j δ
∑
ri. Finally, increment t by δ.
This process terminates in finitely many iterations because in each iteration some agent com-
pletes its allocation of some bundle. 
Examination of the above proof reveals:
Corollary 15. There is a polynomial time algorithm for checking whether a given allocation is
Pareto efficient.
4.3. No Incentive Compatibility for the Variable Speeds Variant. We note that the
synchrony imposed among agents by the SG mechanism is key to its incentive compatibility and
envy-freeness properties (indeed, the properties hold even if the basic mechanism is extended with
the same speed function for all agents). If different agents have different speed functions under
the extended SG mechanism, Theorems 2 and 7, showing incentive compatibility, fail to hold.
The argument breaks down as soon as it uses termination times, in Lemma 3. Below is a counter-
example for strategy-proofness; a similar idea gives counter-examples for group strategy-proofness
and envy-freeness.
Example 16. Assume m = n = 4 and that all ri = qj = 1. Let the speed function for agent 1 be
1 over the interval [0, 1]. The speeds of agents 2, 3, and 4 equal 1 over the interval [0, 1/2], 0 over
the interval (1/2, 5/6], and 3 over the interval (5/6, 1]. The preference orders of agents 1 and 2 are
(1, 2, 3, 4), and the preference orders of agents 3 and 4 are (2, 4, 3, 1). If all agents bid truthfully,
agent 1 receives the sorted allocation (1/2, 0, 1/2, 0). On the other hand, if agent 1 bids (2, 1, 3, 4)
while the rest bid truthfully, then agent 1 receives the better sorted allocation (1/2, 1/3, 1/6, 0).
5. Envy-Freeness w.r.t. stochastic dominance preference
(This section is the only part of the paper where we use sd preference.)
Given a bundle allocation l, let l¯ denote the relative allocation, where l¯ij = lij/ri.
Theorem 17. Under truthful bidding, every agent i weakly sd-prefers his relative allocation l¯pii∗
to the relative allocation l¯pii′∗ of any other agent i
′.
Proof. Fix any 1 ≤ k ≤M . We are to show that
1
ri
k∑
`=1
lpiipii(`) ≥
1
ri′
k∑
`=1
lpii′pii(`).
Let t be the time at which the last of the bundles pii(1), . . . , pii(k) is exhausted. So tri =∑k
`=1 l
pi
ipii(`)
. No other agent can receive any of these bundles after time t, so tri′ ≥
∑k
`=1 l
pi
i′pii(`). 
6. Other Greedy Mechanisms
As stated in the Introduction, obtaining an efficient and envy-free non-pricing mechanism for
allocating divisible goods is easy, but additionally satisfying incentive compatibility is harder. In
this section we present two greedy mechanisms which satisfy the first two properties but not the
third. To simplify description of the mechanisms, assume that m = n and that all ri = qj = 1; it
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is straightforward to generalize the mechanisms beyond this restriction, and our counterexamples
are possible even with it.
Mechanism 1: The mechanism proceeds iteratively. In round i, it considers the ith-favorite
goods of all agents who still have not been allocated a full unit of goods. Among such agents, if
the ith-favorite good of a set S of agents is good j, the remaining quantity of good j is allocated
equally among the agents in S, subject to no agent getting more than a total of one unit of goods.
(Some of good j may remain after the round.)
Mechanism 2: The mechanism has a notion of time, similar to SG. Goods allocation starts
at time 0 and is completed at time 1. During this interval each agent receives goods at rate 1.
The interval is punctuated by finitely many critical instants at which some of the agents switch
which good they are receiving. The first critical instant is 0 and the others are the times at which
some nonempty set of agents T finishes receiving their promised allocation of a good. At such
an instant, the mechanism identifies, for each of the agents in T , the next-favorite good on their
list that has not yet been fully promised to other agents. The mechanism promises each agent in
T some of that good, in the following fashion: let Tj be the subset of T requesting good j and
let u be the amount of good j that has not been previously promised. Then each agent in Tj is
promised an equal share of u subject to no agent exceeding a total of one unit of goods. (The
next critical instant affecting these agents is of course easily computed.) The mechanism then
proceeds to the next critical instant.
The proofs given above, for showing that the SG mechanism is efficient and envy-free, extend
easily to showing that Mechanisms 1 and 2 are also efficient and envy-free. Here, however, are
counterexamples to incentive compatibility:
Example 18. Mechanism 1: Let m = n = 4; name the goods A, . . . ,D. Agent 1’s preference
list is A,B,C,D; agents 2 and 3 have preferences A,C,B,D; and agent 4’s favorite good is B. If
the agents bid truthfully then in round 1, agent 4 is allocated all of good B, while the first three
agents are each allocated a third of good A. In the second round agent 1 is left out while agents
2 and 3 are allocated half of good C. In round 3 no allocations are made, and in round 4 good D
is allocated among the first three agents. The allocation to agent 1 is therefore (A : 1/3, D : 2/3).
If instead agent 1 submits the preference list A,C,B,D then she is treated the same as agents 2
and 3, and her allocation is (A : 1/3, C : 1/3, D : 1/3), which she prefers.
The counterexample for the second mechanism is more involved.
Example 19. Mechanism 2: Let m = n = 8; name the goods A, . . . ,H. We specify only the
essential components of the preference orders. The preference order of agent 1 is alphabetical,
(A, . . . ,H). Agents 2, 3, 4 have the preference order (A,G,H, F, . . .). Agents 5, 6, 7 have the
preference order (B,C,E, F, . . .). Agent 8 has the preference order (B,D, . . .). If all agents report
their preferences truthfully, agent 1 gets the allocation (A : 1/4, C : 1/4, D : 1/4, F : 1/4); if agent
1 lies and reports the order (A,C,E,D, . . .) she gets the allocation (A : 1/4, C : 1/4, D : 1/4, E :
1/4), which she prefers.
7. Discussion
Our main open problem is the one mentioned in the Introduction, i.e., achieving approximate
versions of the properties of the SG mechanism but when agents’ preferences are representable by
utility functions.
Another natural open question concerns the existence of mechanisms to produce lexicographi-
cally most equitable allocations, having favorable algorithmic and game-theoretic properties (esp.,
incentive compatibility). The SG mechanism is not very equitable: see Appendix A.
Finally, one expects that allocation quality will increase with the diversity of agent prefer-
ences. A natural waystep to consider is the very diverse setting in which agent preferences are
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independent uniformly random permutations of 1, . . . ,m. This suggests many interesting ques-
tions, e.g., what is the distribution of βk as in Eqn. A.2, for the allocation a given by the SG
mechanism; and, what is the distribution of the maximized value of t as in LP (A.1), both for
various values of k. Regarding the latter question, for n = m and all ri = qj = 1, there is a
correspondence in the case k = 1 with the collision statistics of random pointers, and so it is
known that t→ (log log n)/(log n); for larger k there is a rough correspondence with the “power
of two choices” literature [3, 20], suggesting likely asymptotics of (log k)/(log log n) for fixed k,
although the correspondence between the problems is not close enough for us to state this with
certainty.
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Appendix A. Equitability of Allocations
It is interesting to consider whether an allocation mechanism is equitable—minimizing, in
some measurable sense, the disparity in the welfare of the players. In spite of being deterministic
and treating all agents symmetrically, the SG mechanism is not particularly equitable, except as
regards how much each agent receives of his most-preferred good. We provide an example showing
that even the allocations of each agent’s two most preferred goods may be quite inequitable.
On the other hand we describe a time-efficient algorithm that, for any given 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
equitably allocates the top k goods for each agent. We further define the notion of a lexicograph-
ically most equitable allocation and give a time-efficient algorithm to find one. In this section we
consider only the non-Leontief case.
Recall that for an allocation a let a¯ denotes the relative allocation a¯ij = aij/ri. For any
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, say that an allocation is equitable w.r.t. agents’ top k choices if it belongs to
argmax
a
min
i
(a¯ipii(1) + . . .+ a¯ipii(k)),
where the max is over all allocations a.
It is easy to see that the allocation produced by the SG mechanism is equitable for k = 1.
However, as the following example illustrates, it is not equitable for k = 2, or larger values of k.
Example 20. Let n = 2, m = 3, r1 = r2 = 1, q1 = 1/2, q2 = 5/6, and q3 = 2/3. Let the
preference list of the first agent be (1, 2, 3) and that of the second agent (2, 3, 1). Then the SG
mechanism gives sorted allocations of (1/2, 1/6, 1/3) and (2/3, 1/3, 0) respectively to the agents,
so each receives 2/3 of his total allocation from his top two choices. On the other hand, the
sorted allocations (1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/3, 2/3, 0) are also feasible, and in this case each agent receives
his entire allocation from his top two choices.
Next, we show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm which, given k, (ri), (qj) and the list
of agent preferences, obtains an allocation that is equitable w.r.t. agents’ top k choices. In fact
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this allocation x = (xij) is the solution to the linear program given below, together with t, the
minimum over agents of the relative allocation from the agent’s top k goods.
Maximize t(A.1)
Such that ∀i : t ≤ 1
ri
(
k∑
`=1
xipii(`)
)
∀i :
m∑
j=1
xij = ri
∀j :
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ qj
∀i ∀j : xij ≥ 0
Finally, let us define the notion of the lexicographically most equitable allocation, which intu-
itively is an allocation that simultaneously optimizes for each k, to the extent possible. For any
allocation a, and each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, define
(A.2) βk = min
i
(a¯ipii(1) + . . .+ a¯ipii(k)).
Now, define a lexicographically most equitable allocation to be one that lexicographically maximizes
(β1, . . . , βm).
We now give a polynomial-time algorithm to find a lexicographically most equitable allocation—
it involves solving m LPs derived from LP (A.1). The first LP simply computes β1 by solving
LP (A.1) for k = 1. Next, for each k, 2 ≤ k ≤ m, add the following constraints to LP (A.1) and
solve it to determine βk:
∀i,∀1 ≤ h ≤ k − 1 : 1
ri
(
h∑
`=1
xipii(`)
)
≥ βh.
Clearly, the last LP will yield a most equitable allocation.
Example 21. For the agents in Example 20, the lexicographically most equitable allocation is
(given as a sorted allocation): (1/2, 1/3, 1/6) for agent 1 and (1/2, 1/2, 0) for agent 2. This is
different from both the SG allocation and the allocation that is equitable w.r.t. agents’ top 2
choices.
Although equitability would seem to be a desirable property, it must be noted that an equitable
allocation need not be even Pareto efficient:
Example 22. Let n = 3, m = 4, r1 = r2 = r3 = 2, q1 = q2 = 1, q3 = q4 = 2. Let the preference
lists be pi1 = (1, 2, 3, 4), pi2 = (3, 4, 1, 2), pi3 = (4, 3, 1, 2). For any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the following
allocation is lexicographically most equitable, and even stronger, it simultaneously optimizes all
βk in Eqn. A.2:
a1 = (1, 1, 0, 0), a2 = (0, 0, 2− x, x), a3 = (0, 0, x, 2− x).
Yet this allocation is Pareto efficient only in the single case x = 0.
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